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STANDING OF FEDERAL SECURITIES
PLAINTIFFS-WHICH WAY THE TREND
Cezar M. Froelich* and Joseph H. Spiegel**
The question of who is a proper party to seek recovery under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 has been a topic of
controversy and active debate for more than twenty years. In this Article
the authors reexamine this controversy in light of several recent decisions and
suggest that the courts adopt a flexible, transactional standing analysis to
properly limit 10b-5 plaintiffs in a manner which is consistent with the statu-
tory purpose and more clearly reflects changing economic conditions.
ESPITE the passing of more than twenty-five years since the
landmark decision in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co." created
a private right of action to enforce Section 10(b) 2 of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934,1 and Rule 1Ob-5 4 adopted thereunder,
*Partner; Shefsky, Saitlin & Froelich Ltd.; Chicago, Illinois.
** Associate; Shefsky, Saitlin & Froelich Ltd.; Chicago, Illinois. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of John Bilanko and Leslie I. Lehr,
members of the DePaul Law Review.
1. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
2. Section 10 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act].
4. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful.for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
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the question of who is the proper party to seek recovery continues to
be the subject of active debate among the courts5 and in commen-
tary. 6 At issue is the so-called Birnbaum7 rule, requiring the plain-
tiff to be either the purchaser or seller of securities in order to main-
tain standing in actions brought under the general anti-fraud provi-
sions of Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.
-Recognizing that a strict application of the Birnbaum rule pre-
cludes significant numbers of investors, who are neither purchasers
nor sellers, but, who incur damages as a result of fraud in connection
with a purchase or sale of securities, from pursuing a federal remedy,
the courts have attempted to fashion a doctrine of 'standing which
is consistent with -the broad remedial language of Rule 10b-5,8 while
ostensibly adhering to Birnbaum for fear that failure to do so would
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5 (1974).
5. There have been at least twenty federal circuit court opinions since 1969 deal-
ing with the issue of standing to sue. Among the more recent cases which are repre-
sentative of the issue are the following: Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579 (5th Cir. 1974); Eason v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
486 F.2d 139 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Manor Drug Stores
v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W.
3279 (Nov. 12, 1974); Mount Clements Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th
Cir. 1972).
6. Commentary on the issue of standing has been extensive. See, e.g., Boone &
McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 617 (1971);
Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Undey
Rule 10b-5 Is Involved, 20 BuFF. L. REV. 93 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of
the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Ruder,
Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-
Standing to Sue Under Rule lOb-5, 26 Bus. LAw. 1289 (1971); Sommer, Rule
lOb-5: Notes for Legislation, 17 WEST. RES. L. REV. 1029 (1966); Comment, Se-
curities-Rule.,.10b-5-Purchaser-Seller and Deception Elements Held not Strict. Pre-
requisites to Liability in Civil Action under SEC Rule 10b-5, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV.
978 (1967); Note, Securities-Rule lOb-5-Non-Purchaser-Seller with a Vital Stake
in the Outcome of a Dispute Involving Fraud in Connection with the Purchase or
Sale of Securities Has Standing to Sue, 42 FORDHAM L. .REv. 688 (1974); Note,
10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24 HASTINGS
L; J. 1007 (1973).
7. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
8. SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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subject potential defendants to unlimited liability. 9 The reluctance
,to overrule Birnbaum has unfortunately resulted in several major ex-
ceptions to the purchaser-seller requirement, as well as the develop-
ment of a rule of standing which is neither correct as a matter of law
nor capable of consistent application.
It is the purpose of this Article to suggest that recent decisions in-
terpreting Birnbaum clearly demonstrate that its rationale no longer
exists. Rather, the courts should follow the lead of the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,'0 and adopt a
flexible standing test based upon an analysis of the entire transaction
or series of transactions involved, which reflects the statutory pur-
pose and reasonably limits the scope of Rule lOb-5.
On the assumption that a liberal interpretation of the "in connec-
tion with" clause, in the context of the expansive statutory language,
would result in lOb-5 actions being brought for fraud only remotely
connected with securities transactions, the courts, using the doctrine
of common law fraud as a guide, have at various times required
plaintiffs to prove privity," reliance, 2 and causation."3  Recent de-
cisions, however, indicate that the primary limitation on private ac-
tions brought under Rule 10b-5 is the purchaser-seller requirement
first set forth in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp."4
In Birnbaum the plaintiffs were minority shareholders of the New-
port Steel Corporation who, in a representative and derivative action,
alleged that the directors and the controlling stockholder of Newport
had rejected a favorable merger offer from another corporation in
order to permit the controlling stockholder to sell his stock to a third
corporation at a substantial premium. The complaint alleged spe-
cific acts of fraud including misrepresentations in letters to the New-
port stockholders at the time of the merger negotiations and again
after -the sale. It was contended that the sale constituted fraud in
9. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
10. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
11. See Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Telev. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
12. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
13. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
14. 193 F.ad 461 (2d Cir.), cort, denied, 343 UJ.S. 956 (1952),
[Vol. 24:510
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violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, even though neither the
plaintiffs nor the company had purchased or sold any securities in
reliance upon the misrepresentations.' 5
Affirming a dismissal of the complaint, the Second Circuit relied
heavily upon its own interpretation of the legislative and adminis-
trative intent behind Rule 10b-5. Of particular significance was the
SEC's public release announcing the adoption of Rule 1 Ob-5.
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption of
a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of
securities. The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of
securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loop-
hole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by
prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage
in fraud in their purchase.'l
Thus, the court reasoned that:
While the Rule may have been somewhat loosely drawn its meaning and
scope are not difficult to ascertain when reference is had to the scheme of
SEC Regulation and the purpose underlying the adoption of X-101B-5.
Prior to its adoption the only prohibitions against fiaud in the sale or pur-
chase of securities were contained in Section 17(a)' 7 of the 1933 Act, ...
and Section 15(c)' s of the 1934 Act. . . . Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act
only made it unlawful to defraud or deceive purchasers of securities, and,
Section 15(c) of the 1934 Act dealt only with fraudulent practices by secu-
rity brokers to dealers in the over-the-counter markets. No prohibition
existed against fraud on a seller of securities by the purchaser if the latter
was not a broker or a dealer.. . . The SEC's press release . . . shows that
the Commission was attempting only to make the same prohibitions con-
tained in Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applicable to purchasers as well as
to sellers. That such was the only purpose of Rule X-101B-5 is made
abundantly clear when the language of the Rule is compared with the lan-
guage of Section 17(a); the Commission simply copied Section 17(a),
adding the words "any person" in place of "the purchaser" and a final
clause "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."'1
The opinion emphasized that the absence of a provision in Section
10(b) expressly intended to protect stockholders against a breach
15. The plaintiffs argued that the applicability of Rule lOb-5 was not limited to
actual purchasers or sellers of securities, but that the general proscription of fraud
.,upon any person" includes and supplements the common law liability of those who
violate their corporate fiduciary obligations. 193 F.2d at 463.
16. SECUaRnEs AcT RELEASE No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
17. SECURITIES AcT OF 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
18. SEcuRrrEs AcT OF 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1970).
19. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders, similar to the one contained
in Section 16(b)20 of the 1934 Act
strengthens the conclusion that that section was directed solely at that type
of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale
or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of cor-
porate affairs, and that Rule X-10B-5 extended protection only to the
defrauded purchaser or seller. 21
While the Birnbaum rule may have been a reasonable description
of the court's understanding of the class of persons protected by Rule
1Ob-5 in 1952, the subsequent decline in "face-to-face" dealings be-
tween purchasers and sellers, the complexity of securities transac-
tions,22 and the increasing sophistication of fraudulent schemes2" have
required courts in recent years to expand the definitions of purchase
and sale,2 4 as well as the class of persons falling into the category of
purchasers and sellers.25 Thus confusion among the various circuits
arises from juxtaposing the mechanical application of Birnbaum's
Rule with attempts to protect investors in a manner consistent with
the Supreme Court's admonition that "[S]ection 10(b) must be read
flexibly, not technically and restrictively. 2 6
Notwithstanding the erosion of the Birnbaum rule, many courts
still support retention of at least an attenuated purchaser-seller re-
quirement on the incorrect ground that such a prerequisite is con-
stitutionally compelled2 7 in order to comply with the "standing" re-
quirements governed by Article III of the United States Constitution.
To the contrary, under the correct application of this standing ap-
proach, the plaintiff must have a sufficient interest in a real contro-
20. SECuUTRMEs EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
21. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
22. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
23. See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. .1967).
24. This expansion has been consistent with the definitions used in the 1934 Act.
For example § 3(a)(13) provides: [t]he terms "buy" and "purchase" each include
any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)
(1970). Likewise, § 3(a)(14) provides: [t]he terms "sale" and "sell" each include
any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970). See
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bur., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir.
1970).
25. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970).
26. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
27. See Mount Clements Indus., Inc., v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1972).
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versy with the defendant in order to satisfy the constitutionally man-
dated jurisdictional requirements of Article III of the United States
Constitution, in addition to meeting the non-constitutional require-
ment that "the interests sought to be protected by the complaint [are]
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute. 2
s
In applying these tests, however, the courts, in addition to often be-
coming confused as to whether the Birnbaum rule was merely a
definition of the "zone of protection" aspect of the standing test
(which the authors believe it was) or whether it represented an ad-
ditional limitation on Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, have also gen-
erally interpreted the legislative and administrative intent behind
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 as requiring that sellers of securities
be afforded the same protection previously limited to purchasers of
securities under Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.29  Thus, decisions
favoring a strict application of the Birnbaum rule have narrowly
defined the class of persons protected by Rule 1Ob-5, thereby denying
standing to plaintiffs who were neither purchasers nor sellers."
Although the Birnbaum rule has repeatedly been set forth as the
sole standing requirement in lOb-5 actions, recent decisions demon-
strate that such an application is inconsistent with the traditional con-
stitutional standing rules applied 'to cases brought in federal courts,
and effectively precludes a substantial number of potential plaintiffs
from pursuing a remedy to which they otherwise would be entitled.
An example of this improper use of the Birnbaum rule as the sole
standing test is the Third Circuit's decision in Landy v. Federal De-
posit Insurance .Corp.1
In Landy, the president of the Eatontown National Bank, Schotte,
engaged in a scheme involving the misuse of bank funds for the
purpose of trading in speculative securities. This scheme, in turn,
resulted in the financial collapse of the bank, and left the sharehold-
ers with worthless stock.3 2
28. Association of Data Proc. Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)'
29. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
30. See, e.g., Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d. 139 (3rd Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 469 F.2d 579
(5th Cir. 1974); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
31. 486 F.2d 139 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
32. Id. at 143-44.
1975]
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Plaintiffs, minority shareholders and purchasers of the bank stock
during the period the fraudulent activities of the president took
place, brought suit on behalf of themselves as individuals, deriva-
tively on behalf of the defendant bank, and as representatives of all
the shareholders in the bank. They claimed that violations of Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 occurred when the president concealed
the scheme through false statements to the shareholders upon which
they relied in making their purchases. 8
With the Banker's Life3 4 decision before it, the Landy court ap-
peared to recognize that although there was
some question whether the fraudulent scheme of Schotte . . . was the type
"usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities" rather than
fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs .
[A]II that is now required is an injury to an investor caused by deceptive
practices "touching" on the purchase or the sale of securities by that in-
vestor.3 5
Judge Rosenn conceded that this requirement may have been met
on the facts of Landy, but nevertheless dismissed the action on the
ground that since the plaintiffs were neither purchasers nor sellers
of the two hundred million dollars in stock traded by Schotte through
the bank, the Birnbaum purchaser-seller requirement had not been
satisfied. 8
Viewed in the context of traditional standing rules, this continued
adherence to Birnbaum becomes increasingly difficult to justify.
Clearly, the plaintiffs in Landy suffered injury in fact "in connection
with" a purchase or sale of securities which, under the Banker's Life
criteria, was sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of
Article III. Regardless of the fact that plaintiffs never bought or sold
the stock subject to the fraud, there was causation of loss arising out
of the purchase of the bank's shares which should have been suffi-
cient to sustain an action under Rule 1Ob-5. In other words, it is at
least arguable that plaintiffs were also among the class of persons
the statute was intended to protect.37  Consequently, as a result of
33. Id.
34. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
35. 486 F.2d at 153-55.
36. Id. at 155.




the court's application of Birnbaum as the sole standing test, plaintiffs
were foreclosed from pursuing a remedy which should have been
available.
The most significant case ,to date deciding the issue of 10b-5
standing under Birnbaum, in terms of its impact on the continued
viability of the purchaser-seller requirement, is Eason v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp. (GMAC).38 The plaintiffs in Eason were
shareholders of a corporation which purchased an automobile leasing
business from one of the defendants. GMAC, one of the other de-
fendants, financed purchases of automobiles for the leasing business.
In connection with the transaction, the corporate purchaser issued
7,000 shares of its stock to the seller, while the plaintiffs individually
guaranteed the liabilities assumed by the purchaser-including notes
payable to GMAC.
When the leasing business subsequently failed, the corporation
became insolvent and defaulted on the notes. GMAC brought suit
in state court to recover on the guarantees, and the plaintiffs coun-
,tered with a federal action seeking rescission of the guarantees, ac-
cusing the defendants of fraud in connection with the sale of securi-
ties. The district court denied the plaintiffs standing, finding that
under Birnbaum, guarantors of a corporation's indebtedness were
neither purchasers nor sellers.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, and in
so doing expressly overruled the Birnbaum purchaser-seller require-
ment. Arguably, the same result could have been reached under
the "forced seller" 9 exception to the Birnbaum rule, but the court
reasoned that the continuing expansion of the class of purchasers
and sellers had diminished the effectiveness of -the rule to the extent
that its retention was no longer warranted. Specifically rejected
were the, arguments that: (1) the purchaser-seller requirement is
constitutionally compelled; (2) abandonment of the rule would
prompt an unmanageable flood of federal litigation; and, (3) reten-
tion of the rule is necessary to preserve consistency in the interpreta-
tion of federal securities legislation.
38. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
39. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., Inc., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967). Under the "forced seller" approach, the involuntary conver-




Viewing the decisive issue to be "whether, notwithstanding the
fact that they were neither purchasers nor sellers of a security, plain-
tiffs may obtain relief under Rule lOb-5,"40 the court examined the
cases which have interpreted the Birnbaum rule as the sole standing re-
quirement in the constitutional and jurisdictional sense, and held:
"We are satisfied that such an interpretation of Birnbaum is unwar-
ranted and we have no doubt that the plaintiff's interest in the con-
troversy before us is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article
In addition to overruling Birnbaum as the sole "standing" re-
quirement, the court also rejected the contention that the absence
of such a limitation would create unlimited access to the federal
courts. Noting that the availability of private relief required the
plaintiff to demonstrate membership in the class of investors pro-
tected by Rule 10b-5 and injury as a direct consequence of the al-
leged violation, Judge Stevens drew an analogy to Section 4 of the
Clayton Act42 which expressly authorizes "any person injured in his
business or property by reason of an antitrust violation" to sue for
damages. "Although that broad language opened 'nearly limitless
possibilities' for damage recovery, a case by case evaluation of what
may be described either as the 'standing' issue or the concept of in-
jury has resulted in a significant limitation on the potential scope
of recovery.""
Despite the court's reluctance to define the scope of lOb-5 actions
other than on an ad hoc basis, Judge Stevens, nevertheless sug-
gested that "[Instead of stating the issue in terms of standing, we
think it is more useful to ask whether the plaintiffs were mem-
bers of the class for whose special benefit Rule 10b-5 was
adopted. '
Unfortunately, the "special class" limitation suggested by the
court, as a practical matter, differs little from the "zone of protec-
tion" test which has been criticized as being of questionable value
40. 490 F.2d 654, 656 (1973).
-4"1. ld. at 657.
.42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
43. 490 F.2d 654, 661 n.29.
44. Id. at 658,
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in screening out frivolous securities fraud allegations.45 Those tests
become ambiguous when used in connection with the expansive lan-
guage of Rule lOb-5, even though those limitations are fundamen-
tally sound when applied to other statutes.
Rather than suggesting another inflexible rule as an alternative
to Birnbaum, the authors propose a method of transactional analysis
in order to achieve uniform results in complex lOb-5 cases, without
arbitrarily limiting the class of potential plaintiffs. Inherent in such
a method of analysis is the concept that "form should be disregarded
for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality."4 A
court should be free to extend the Rule's protection to those persons
who,
suffer significant injury as a direct consequence of fraud in connection
with a securities transaction, even though their participation in the trans-.
action did not involve either the purchase or sale of a security. 4 7
In another 10b-5 action, Karvelas v. Sellas,48 the court acknowl-
edged the repudiation of Birnbaum in the Eason decision, and found
the crux of the issue to be whether the fraudulent conduct occurred
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. In spite of
'the absence of a purchase or sale by the plaintiff of the securities
subject to the fraudulent transaction, the facts did allege a trans-
action which was a part of a larger scheme to defraud. Thus, the
court held that "the degree of 'touching' which is required before
the 'in connection with' clause is satisfied . . is sufficient if a cor-
porate mismanagement scheme includes within it as an essential act
a securities transaction, the motive of which is to further the pur-
poses of the scheme.. 49
There can be little doubt that the search for a limiting doctrine
in Rule 10b-5 actions 'has been marked by an increasing reluctance
to ad-here to inflexible rules which do not reflect changing economic
conditions. The vast number of small stockholders, the variety of fi-
nancial transactions, and the increased potential for fraud have em-
45. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate
Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L. J. 425; Davis, The Liberalized Law of
Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970).
46. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
47. Eason v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 659 (1973).
48. 376 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
49. Id. at 1014,
1975] 519
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phasized the need for effective enforcement of the securities laws. Un-
fortunately, the absence of legislative or administrative guidance has
left the courts to develop a standing doctrine on a case-by-case basis,
the result of which has brought about arbitrary limits on the access
-to federal courts, with little regard for the validity of the plaintiff's
claim.
Although both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are silent with
respect ,to the class of persons protected by the statute, there pres-
ently appears to be little correlation between a rule requiring plain-
tiffs to be purchasers or sellers, and the damages suffered as a result
of the prohibited conduct. When viewed in the light of economic
reality, the argument that Birnbaum is constitutionally compelled be-
comes difficult to support. For instance, recent decisions have dem-
onstrated that persons incurring damages in connection with pro-
hibited conduct may be denied a federal remedy under Birn-
baum, while, on the other hand, there is nothing to suggest that
plaintiffs who otherwise meet the standing requirements will be able
to present an actionable 1Ob-5 claim. Thus, to the extent that the
Eason decision minimizes such arbitrary distinctions by shifting the
emphasis in lOb-5 actions to the substantive elements, without aban-
doning the correctly applied standing requirement, it is a correct de-
cision which should be followed by the United States Supreme Court
which has recently agreed to review, on certiorari, Manor Drug
Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps.5"
50. 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3279 (Nov. 12,
1974).
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